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Abstract: One’s first impression is that Brouwer’s Continuity Theorem of
intuitionistic analysis, that every total, real-valued function of a real variable
is continuous, stands in straightforward contradiction to a simple theorem
of conventional real analysis, that there are discontinuous, real-valued func-
tions. Here we argue that, despite philosophical views to the contrary, first
impressions are not misleading; the Brouwer Theorem, together with its proof,
presents mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics with an antimony,
one that can only be resolved by a close, foundational study of the structure
of the intuitive continuum.
Philosophia Scientiæ, Cahier spécial 6, 2006, 81–94.
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It is no simple and uncontentious business to pronounce authorita-
tively where, in any body of scientiﬁc thought, natural science or ma-
thematics ends and philosophy takes over. All serious mathematics, with
set theory and category theory as premier examples, makes assumptions
open to philosophical examination. In this, mathematical intuitionism is
no exception. The intuitionists L.E.J. Brouwer (1881 - 1966) and Arend
Heyting (1898 - 1980), perhaps like all revolutionaries, were given to phi-
losophical rumination. In Europe during the early 20th Century, it seems
that mathematical papers could be written and published in a style more
verdantly literary and philosophical than is common today. These com-
monplaces and historical facts may have misled some into thinking that
intuitionistic mathematics owes a greater debt to philosophy than its
classical cousin. Yet, in truth, the intuitionism inspired by Brouwer and
Heyting is mathematics ﬁrst and philosophy later.
One would now be hard pressed to say what the oﬃcial or intended
philosophy of intuitionism is. There seems no more eagerness, among
contemporary intuitionists, to embrace the philosophy once adumbrated
by Brouwer than there is among contemporary set theorists to embrace
the extramathematical thought of Georg Cantor. Heyting’s eclectic out-
look, as presented in [Heyting 1931], does not now seem an attractive
option. Dummett’s antirealism (see [Dummett 1977 and 2000]) remains
the bare outline of a philosophy, awaiting clear speciﬁcation of what is
meant by suitably antirealistic ‘proofs’ and ‘constructions.’ Once those
speciﬁcations are given, a further goal is still to be reached: intuitionistic
logic must be proven sound and complete with respect to the antireali-
stic semantics of proofs and constructions, and by strictly intuitionistic
means. Until such time, antirealism cannot supply intuitionism with the
foundation antirealists so desire.
That intuitionism is not itself a philosophy does not mean that intui-
tionism never presents philosophical problems. Since intuitionism is ma-
thematics, today’s mathematics contains contradictions: there are ma-
thematical arguments of great initial plausibility, one intuitionistic and
one conventional, whose conclusions stand in straightforward contradic-
tion. To take a famous example, conventional mathematicians claim to
prove, from axioms for analysis or set theory, that some total, real-valued
functions of a real variable are discontinuous on the closed interval [0, 1].
Those mathematicians set out from widely accepted principles governing
real numbers and functions, plus a deﬁnition of continuity, and arrive at
the conclusion that there are real functions over [0, 1] whose graphs are
broken. With more set theory, he or she thinks to prove that the discon-
tinuous functions outnumber the continuous. At the same time, intuitio-
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nists prove with all due rigor Brouwer’s Continuity Theorem: that every
total, real-valued function is uniformly continuous on [0, 1] and, hence,
that no total function is discontinuous there. The intuitionists’ proof also
calls upon reasonable principles about real numbers, functions and sets,
and the very same deﬁnition of continuity as that commonly employ-
ed. What the conventional mathematician asserts, that very thing the
intuitionist denies.
Philosophers of mathematics commonly seek to reject descriptions
of this state of mathematical play as disturbingly contradictory, one in
which there is real disagreement between intellectually attractive alterna-
tives. To that end, some claim that, although Brouwer’s Theorem might
well contradict results of ordinary real analysis, intuitionistic mathe-
matics cannot be an intellectually attractive competitor to its classical
cousin because it is disastrously weak, relying upon a deductively puny
logic. By their lights, intuitionism lacks one of the principal virtues of a
successful scientiﬁc theory, that it yield enough consequences of the right
sorts. Famously, there is a range of conventional consequences thought
to be of a ‘right’ sort that the intuitionist cannot obtain. Those are the
intuitionistic equivalents of the tertium non datur or TND,
φ ∨ ¬φ.
Conventional mathematicians deemTNDmathematically essential. Exer-
cising his gift for memorable hyperbole, David Hilbert (1862-1943) once
exclaimed, “Taking the principle of excluded middle from the mathe-
matician would be the same, say, as proscribing the telescope to the
astronomer or to the boxer the use of his ﬁsts."[Hilbert 1927 476] Both
parties to the dispute agree that, without this assumption, one cannot
prove such mainstays of conventional real analysis as the Intermediate
Value Theorem: that the graph of a continuous function whose value is
strictly positive at the left end of a nontrivial closed interval and strictly
negative at its right end has to cross the x-axis at least once in the in-
terval. Critics of intuitionism maintain that the omission of TND drags
intuitionism below the level of acceptable theory.
In decrying supposed weakness in intuitionistic mathematics, com-
mentators are not drawing a purely syntactical comparison between for-
mal systems. Hilbert was not distraught merely because the intuitionist,
in some formalism for propositional logic, could not produce a string or
string type of this kind
p ∨ ¬p.
That this formula is underivable does not show that the intuitionist has
missed a truth. It is no barrier to the success of conventional logic that,
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in systems with → and ¬ as sole connective signs, the above-displayed
shape is absent from the list of formal validities. Of course, there could
be a dispute among mathematicians over the relative expressive powers
of two competing theories, but that is not the issue here.
The trouble over TND has to do with propositions or truths expres-
sed. The intuitionist maintains that the scheme TND captures no truth
or validity he or she has overlooked. The intuitionist proves that TND
is invalid using strictly mathematical assumptions. For example, Brou-
wer’s Theorem itself entails the failure of TND. Were TND generally
valid, every real number would be rational or irrational. It follows by
function comprehension that the salt-and-pepper function, outputting 1
on rational numbers and 0 on irrationals, would be total and real-valued.
However, it is plainly an everywhere discontinuous function. Hence, the
tertium non datur is not valid, QED. In consequence, the intuitionist
feels herself under no more obligation to accept the validity of TND
than she is to accept the validity of other plainly invalid principles, for
example,
p ∨ ¬q.
To harp on the intuitionist’s inability to prove TND, or to imply that
it is merely an unfortunate and remediable lack, would be to ignore or
prejudge the central issue presented by the intuitionistic version of the
mathematical facts. That TND is invalid, like the Brouwer Theorem, is
a fact of the latter kind.
The failure of TND does not appear to create an insurmountable
obstacle to the progress of intuitionism, even in the realm of applied
mathematics. Errett Bishop (1928-1983) and coworkers in constructi-
ve mathematics have demonstrated that, although Brouwerians cannot
claim the Intermediate Value Theorem, they can derive valuable conso-
lation prizes. They proved that reasonable approximations to the Theo-
rem are obtainable intuitionistically, among them the theorem that, for
f continuous over [a, b] with f(a) negative and f(b) positive, and for any
natural number n, there is a real number cn in [a, b] for which the abso-
lute value of f(cn) is less than 1/n. [Beeson 1985 11-12] Logicians know
this as an instance of a general phenomenon: every conventional theo-
rem Φ of set theory or arithmetic admits a reformulation Ψ such that Φ
and Ψ are equivalent conventionally but Ψ is a theorem of intuitionistic
mathematics. Recently, the reach of intuitionistic mathematics received
further conﬁrmation. Geoﬀrey Hellman had challenged constructivists
to prove Gleason’s Theorem, which he believed foundational to quan-
tum mechanics. [Hellman 1993] Douglas Bridges and Fred Richman re-
sponded by proving that the Gleason Theorem (not a reformulation, but
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the statement as Gleason originally had it [Gleason 1957]) is a theorem
of Bishop-style constructive mathematics and, hence, of intuitionism.
[Richman and Bridges 1999]
No one should go away thinking that charges of weakness and ina-
dequacy can be lodged only against intuitionism. Intuitionists have dis-
covered and mapped mathematical worlds that are hidden from con-
ventional sight. Among these are nontrivial standard models for Alonzo
Church’s (1903-1995) untyped λ-calculus, important to the semantics
of programming languages. The untyped λ -calculus is a formalism for
function deﬁnition and application; its leading idea is Church’s type-
busting conception of a collection of mathematical items that are both
functions and arguments to those functions simultaneously. Type and si-
ze restrictions enforced in conventional set theory prohibit any standard
conventional model of this notion from existing: Cantor proved that no
set with at least two members can stand in one-to-one correspondence
with the collection of all its endofunctions. In 1969, Dana Scott showed
logicians how to build attractive and informative models of the untyped
λ-calculus [Scott 1973], but these are nonstandard in that only conti-
nuous functions are allowed. Here, as elsewhere, the intuitionist can do
his or her conventional colleague one better. Within an intuitionistic
theory of sets, there are signiﬁcant domains of entities that stand in one-
to-one correspondence with the space of all functions on them. [McCarty
1983] In these function domains, every entity can be both a function and
an allowable input to those very functions: for any element f of the intui-
tionistic structure, f(f), the application of f to itself, yields an output
value. The intuitionist realizes Church’s vision with perfect accuracy; the
conventional mathematician can, at best, approximate it.
Others endeavor to defuse the mathematical standoﬀ between in-
tuitionistic and conventional mathematics by arguing that scholars ha-
ve misinterpreted the statements of intuitionistic mathematicians when
they claim that Brouwer’s Theorem contradicts a result of classical re-
al analysis. Although he may no longer endorse the relevant arguments
(cf. the introduction to [Tait 2005]), William Tait once maintained that
the claims of intuitionistic mathematics do not really contradict those
of conventional mathematics, because the former is in fact a part of the
latter. [Tait 1983] Were that the case, intuitionistic mathematics would
be consistent with classical mathematics, provided that classical mathe-
matics is itself consistent. One of Tait’s arguments for his conclusion
seemed to rely upon the following assertions.
The distinction between constructive and classical rests so-
lely on what principles are admitted for constructing an ob-
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ject of a given type. And since all constructive principles are
classical too, constructive mathematics is a part of classical
mathematics. A classical proof [that] a:A [a is an object of
type A] is constructive just in case it is obtained using only
certain principles of construction. [Tait 1983 182-183]
‘Constructivism’ is said in many ways: strict ﬁnitism, Hilbertian ﬁ-
nitism, Bishop-style constructive mathematics, the Russian constructi-
vism of Markov and followers, ultra-intuitionism, Erlangen constructi-
vism, Russellian predicativism, among others. Certainly, adherents to
these outlooks adopt principles for constructing typed objects, but not
all such principles are classical. In Russian constructivism, Church’s The-
sis rules the roost: every total function with natural number inputs and
outputs is general recursive. On that approach, to construct a higher-
order functional of type [N ⇒ N ] ⇒ N , that is, a map taking total
numerical functions into the natural numbers, it would be suﬃcient to
specify a unique natural number output for each total recursive functi-
on input. This is not classically correct; the global behaviors of classical
functionals of type [N ⇒ N ]⇒ N are not in general determined by their
actions on the total recursive functions.
Furthermore, it is hardly the case that the sole distinction between
constructive mathematics, including intuitionism, and classical mathe-
matics is “what principles are admitted for constructing an object of a
given type.” There are far more things in Brouwerian heaven than are
dreamt of in a philosophy of types. Often, a type is an abstract, con-
glomerate entity over which the Axiom of Choice reigns. Because TND
is intuitionistically invalid and the Axiom of Choice implies TND [Dia-
conescu 1975], there must be nontypes aplenty. In particular, there are
nontrivial subtypes and such quotients of types as the domain of all par-
tial recursive functions, which is a quotient of the set of natural numbers.
Kleene’s number realizability provides an interpretation of intuitionistic
set theory in which the Axiom of Choice fails over that very domain.
[McCarty 1983] [Beeson 1985]
Many standard formalisms associated with intuitionistic mathema-
tics, among them Heyting arithmetic and intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, are subtheories of their classical correlates, in this case, Peano-
Dedekind arithmetic and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, respectively. That
familiar metatheoretic fact in no way entails that intuitionistic mathe-
matics is a part of classical mathematics. The theorems of intuitionistic
mathematics should not be identiﬁed, even extensionally, with the trut-
hs expressed by the formulae of any formal system or systems on their
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standard interpretations. The reasons for this are well known. First, a
mathematical subject, like topology or arithmetic, is neither a formal
system nor a battery of them. While formal systems are individuated
and articulated by formal languages and their grammars, mathemati-
cal subjects are individuated and articulated according to the desires of
mathematicians, especially the authors of mathematical textbooks and
monographs. For one thing, the Turing machines that control the opera-
tions of formal systems know nothing of the importance or unimportance
of any mathematical results their symbolic theorems may represent. Se-
cond, intuitionistic mathematics is not provably complete with respect
to the familiar formalisms deemed to represent it, even when it comes to
propositional logic. Under number realizability, there is a simple proposi-
tional formula in two variables that is valid but has instances unprovable
in intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel. [McCarty 1991]
Logicians also know that certain powerful intuitionistic systems, in-
cluding some that derive formalizations of Brouwer’s Theorem, are sound
with respect to topological, realizability and category-theoretic interpre-
tations. [Troelstra and van Dalen 1988] Thus interpreted, all theorems of
those systems can be taken to yield conventional truths (provided the me-
tatheory is conventional) concerning topological spaces and continuous
functions, or sets with recursive structures, as the case may be. For exam-
ple, under realizability,TND fails because it entails the solvability of the
halting problem. Were it supposed that one or another of these interpre-
tations tells the world what intuitionism really means, the truths yielded
on those interpretations by intuitionistic formulae would be (parts of)
intuitionistic mathematics and conventional mathematics at one and the
same time. Hence, a goodly portion of intuitionistic mathematics, viewed
in this manner as a set of conventional truths, could not contradict true
classical mathematics. On this proposal, Brouwer’s-Continuity-Theorem-
so-construed would be what the Theorem truly says, and would not stand
in logical opposition to any correct ﬁnding of ordinary real analysis.
It is unfortunate for this suggestion that no one seems able convin-
cingly to say which of the vast range of available interpretations for
intuitionistic formal theories is guaranteed to provide the supposedly
true conventional meanings of those theories. Within realizability, Brou-
wer’s Theorem gives a version of the Kreisel-Lacombe-Schoenﬁeld-Čeitin
Theorem for eﬀective operations [Beeson 1985 61-64]; within the topolo-
gical model for analysis devised by Scott [Scott 1968], it induces a very
diﬀerent statement about sheaves over Baire space. It would seem that
both cannot be candidates for the one meaning of the original theorem.
It remains to be determined which (or which of the inﬁnite variety of
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interpretative alternatives to them) captures the real and unequivocal
meaning of Brouwer’s great discovery.
The supply of truths obtained by ﬁltering formal intuitionistic theo-
rems through the aforementioned interpretations does not generally amo-
unt to any recognizable branch of conventional mathematics. Those in-
terpretations often show little respect for the signiﬁcance intuitionists
attach to their discoveries. Sometimes, the conventional truths expressed
under interpretation by important intuitionistic theorems turn out to be
singularly unimportant. In a topological model over Sierpinski space, the
failure of the validity of TND registers the triviality that the Sierpinski
topology is not discrete.
The formulae logicians ﬁnd holding, thanks to conventional metalo-
gic, in a topological or realizability model, those comprising the ‘internal
mathematics’ of the structure, do not always correspond to intuitionistic
statements or reasonable facsimiles thereof. In consequence, they seem
to oﬀer no serious candidates for the true meanings of the sayings of
intuitionists. Assume that the model giving us the oﬃcial conventional
meanings of intuitionistic statements is Scott’s model for analysis [Scott
1968]. In that structure, Brouwer’s Continuity Theorem holds, as do all
true formulae of conventional ﬁrst-order arithmetic, when the metalogic
is classical. This fact means that a proponent of the suggestion under
review has some explaining to do. To see this, let T (x, y, z) be the Kleene
T -predicate internal to the elementary arithmetic of Scott’s model. In
that structure, the true statement
¬¬[∃y.T (x, x, y) ∨ ¬∃y.T (x, x, y)]
is presumably the meaning, both intuitionistic and conventional, of an
instance of an intuitionistic theorem of logic, namely,
¬¬(φ ∨ ¬φ).
The substatement one gets by eliding the leading double negation,
∃y.T (x, x, y) ∨ ¬∃y.T (x, x, y),
is also true, and is the Scott interpretation of the corresponding instance
of φ∨¬φ. Although, in conventional logic and in the Scott structure, the
latter formula is fully equivalent to the former, it represents no truth of
intuitionistic mathematics. (It would be taken by Russian constructivists
to make a plainly false claim.) There is then nothing in the presumptive
meanings of the two statements and the mathematics of Scott’s struc-
ture to explain these facts, to explain why the intuitionist would happily
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endorse the ﬁrst formula and fervently refuse the second. In this respect,
Scott’s model is no special case; similar examples can be found for rea-
lizability interpretations.
Lastly, one worries that this suggestion – that intuitionistic mathe-
matics is identiﬁable, in whole or in part, with the interpretation of a
formalism – is born from an equivocation involving the word ‘interpreta-
tion.’ The interpretations logicians supply for metalogical purposes need
not be and generally are not interpretations in the everyday sense of
the term. Interpretations in the latter sense serve helpfully to illuminate
the usual meanings of one or more sayings; meanings that might other-
wise be dark are brought into interpreted light. The interpretations of
logicians, on the other hand, may have little or nothing to do with the
literal or metaphorical meanings of most words. When one interprets as
a logician, one is required to preserve no part of the interpreted saying
that is nonlogical; only the logical words, the ‘if’s, ‘and’s and ‘all’s, need
to retain their familiar semantical values. For example, if there are an
inﬁnite number of disposable razors, a logician can employ the countable
Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem to cull from the world of disposable razors
and their properties a perfectly appropriate logical interpretation of all
the axioms and theorems of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. It hardly fol-
lows that set theory can be interpreted, in any ordinary sense, as making
spectacular claims about lots and lots of disposable razors.
Some believe that the contradiction posed by intuitionistic analy-
sis can be avoided by appeal to the special constructive meanings of
the logical signs. They would argue that, as a matter of literal, non-
interpreted fact, what the intuitionist says in asserting a mathematical
sentence Φ usually means something quite diﬀerent from the same Φ
issuing from the mouth of a classical mathematician. They would al-
low that the intuitionist’s Φ may be syntactically indistinguishable from
that of her conventional counterpart, that the two mathematicians may
advance syntactically identical deﬁnitions of ‘number,’ ‘set,’ ‘function,’
‘topological space,’ and so forth, and that the two will stand in per-
fect syntactic accord over the truth rules that govern their quantiﬁers
and connectives, e.g., that conjunctions (φ & ψ) are true just in case
both φ and ψ are true. In the face of this large measure of unanimity,
the philosophers in question still insist that the connectives and quan-
tiﬁers of the intuitionist carry meanings distinct from those attached to
the utterances of the classical mathematician, the intuitionistic meanings
being given by a proof-theoretic semantics alternative to standard, truth-
conditional semantics. If justiﬁed, such a move might draw the sting of
paradox from Brouwer’s Continuity Theorem. Should the intuitionist’s
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logical signs bear meanings distinct from the same symbols in conven-
tional mathematics, even if the deﬁnitions of ‘real number,’ ‘real-valued
function’ and ‘continuous’ are identical in form across both brands of
mathematics, the statement proved by Brouwer would not necessarily
be a denial of the familiar theorem that total, discontinuous, real-valued
functions exist over [0, 1].
According to proponents of proof-theoretic semantics, the meaning of
a sentence should not be given in terms of truth conditions, realistically
conceived as conditions that could obtain regardless of anyone’s being
able, even in principle, to recognize their obtaining. Instead, sentence
meanings should be speciﬁed by giving proof conditions, circumstances
under which a sentence would be recognizably proven. An intuitionist’s
sentence would then be considered true if and only if a proof of it is
available. A sentence would be false if it is recognizably disprovable —
perhaps by a plain reduction to an evident absurdity. It is believed that,
on this semantical account, some well-formed mathematical sentences
will fail of both truth and falsity. At present, Riemann’s Hypothesis
(RH for short) would be conveyed by such a sentence. There now exists
neither proof of RH nor disproof, and mathematicians are aware of no
real prospect for altering that circumstance. Therefore, neither RH nor
its negation would currently be true with respect to proof-theoretical
semantics, and the instance RH ∨ ¬RH of TND fails.
Promising as it may seem, this eﬀort to avert contradiction does not
succeed. Just as in conventional mathematics, proofs in intuitionistic
mathematics rely ultimately on basic principles, perhaps the principle of
complete induction for the natural numbers, or the union axiom for sets,
or (a form of) Zermelo’s axiom of separation. Intuitionists rightly take
these and other fundamental principles to be true, they construct proofs
with them, and they come up with noncircular, reasonably convincing
arguments for endorsing them. The crucial point is that these reasonably
convincing arguments are, one and all, plausibility arguments or intui-
tion pumps, not proofs in full regalia. They are intuitionistic analogues
to the kinds of hand-wavings conventional mathematicians employ when
they ﬁrst introduce their students to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. The
intuitionists feel fully justiﬁed in asserting their basic principles, just as
classical set theorists feel justiﬁed in asserting the Union Axiom. Intui-
tionists cannot, and usually do not attempt to, prove the basic principles.
Intuitionists know they are true. After all, that was one of the original,
great ideas of Brouwer’s intuitionism: there are fundamental properties
of important mathematical structures, with unlimited induction on the
natural numbers and forms of set comprehension as paradigmatic ex-
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amples, that are truths of neither language nor logic, but are recognized
nondeductively to obtain. These principles are true, but proofs of them
are not available. This realization is required for the success of intuitio-
nistic mathematics.
Incidentally, a die-hard advocate of proof-theoretic semantics can
hardly now respond that, when it comes to basic principles, the intui-
tionist postulates or assumes the existence of proofs for them. Once we
allow ourselves to shore up claims by postulating their proofs into exis-
tence, we can happily postulate a proof for RH or TND and have done
with it. A similar response is available to anyone who suggests that the
extension of ‘intuitionistically provable’ be enlarged by stipulation to
include the sorts of nondeductive justiﬁcations intuitionists commonly
provide. It would then have to be explained what objection the intuitio-
nist could make to a classical colleague who decided to stipulate thusly
that TND is henceforth provable intuitionistically.
The eﬀorts here assayed for disarming the clash between intuitionistic
and conventional mathematics fail. At the heart of mathematical ana-
lysis lies contradiction, not equivocation. The theorems of intuitionism
should be taken at face value: when the intuitionist asserts that a num-
ber speciﬁed by ρ exists or that a function deﬁned by Φ is continuous,
he or she is making the very same statement as a conventional mathe-
matician who asserts that number ρ exists or that Φ is continuous. And
the intuitionist is contradicting mathematicians who insist that ρ does
not exist or that Φ is actually discontinuous. Intuitionists, who dispute
the truth of various theorems of ordinary mathematics, should be allo-
wed their straightforward, mathematical say, without re-interpretative
interference. It’s time to face the foundational music and recognize that
the steps in Brouwer’s argument for his Continuity Theorem are cogent
and its ultimate assumptions are plausible. Each form of mathematics,
conventional and intuitionistic, oﬀers its own persuasive depiction of the
primary object of analysis, the intuitive continuum, and not a sheaf-
theoretic Doppelgänger or a quasi-continuum in one or another universe
for a set theory relativistically construed.
Perhaps the opposition between intuitionistic and conventional ma-
thematics is the upshot of a subtle mathematical error hidden within the
presuppositions of conventional analysis. To locate that error would be
a project for foundational study. To take up that project is to rejoin a
tradition made venerable by the thought of Eudoxus, Archimedes, New-
ton, Cantor, Dedekind, du Bois-Reymond, Hilbert, Brouwer and Hey-
ting. Intuitionists remain more than a little hopeful that this project
will vindicate the ideas of du Bois-Reymond, Brouwer and Heyting, and
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expose the ﬂaws in the designs of their opponents Cantor, Dedekind and
Hilbert.
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